The following article is part of a blogburst - a simultaneous and cross-linked posting of many blogs on the same theme. This blogburst
commemorates the Munich Olympics Massacre which began in the dawn hour of September 5th, 1972. Go to The Index of the Munich Massacre Blogburst to find links to all the other articles.

The story
At 5:00 AM, exactly 30 years ago, a seminal event in the development of modern terrorism took place. Eight Palestinian terrorists invaded the athletes' housing at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. They killed and took hostage eleven Israeli athletes competing in the Games, demanding the release of 234 imprisoned Arabs and German terrorists. Over the next few tension-filled days, all the hostages and some of the terrorists were killed, mostly due to incompetence and perfidy of the German government. The Olympic Committee made a controversial decision to continue the Games, and has never participated in any memorial for the slain athletes. Eventually almost all the remaining terrorists were hunted down and killed by Israeli agents, directed by then Prime Minister Golda Meir.

Could it have been prevented?
On Monday night, Israeli TV channel one broadcast a documentary about the Munich Massacre. Yarin Kimor, who made the movie, studied the massacre from a few perspectives I wasn’t aware of. It was quite eye opening. The following is a summary of some of the more interesting points he brought up. I don’t know if what he says is as novel as he claims, but most of it was new for me.

I apologize if the Latin spelling of the names is incorrect. The movie only had the names in Hebrew, and not knowing German, it’s hard to determine the correct spelling of German names.

Important note: Yarin Kimor’s documentary is largely critical of the German handling of the massacre, before, during and after the event, although he doesn’t go into the details of the negotiations or the workings of the rescue operation. He also has criticism about the Israeli handling of their side of the affair. When reading this post it should be very clear that the only people who are responsible for the massacre are the perpetrators and those who sent them. This does not mean we shouldn’t look with a critical eye at how the affair was handled on the receiving end.

The main discussion point of the documentary was: Did the Germans receive information about a planned terrorist attack in advance? How about the Israelis, what did they know? Kimor claims that the Germans received information that the terrorist attack was going to happen. He brings as evidence excerpts from the German investigation report on the massacre. According to this report, on the 21st Aug 1972, the Bavarian secret police passed on to Munich Police a warning that a Palestinian commando unit had left Beirut on its way to Munich for a terrorist operation. Manfred Schreiber, Munich Police Chief, was notified but did nothing. On the 24th Aug 1972, Interpol Brussels sent a message to the Bavarian secret police stating the names of two of the terrorists – Badran and Darwis, who were to take part in the operation.

According to a Yediot Aharonot investigation (says Kimor in the movie, but supplies no information about when the story appeared) the East German Shtazi also knew about the attack in advance. Shlomo Levy, an Israeli cameraman was in the East German dormitory at the time of the attack. He says he clearly saw, looking out of the window, one of the terrorists communicating with someone whom he couldn’t see, who could only have been in the same building as Levy himself (the East German building). The terrorist seemed to be receiving information, and made signs with his fingers of six, five and four. Immediately after he saw this, the terrorists demanded that the (West) German snipers be removed from the area. Levy is very sure the terrorist was receiving information from the East German building. Richard Meyer, head of (West) German espionage is very adamant that no espionage service could have known in advance, including the Shtazi.

Ilana Romano, wife of one of the victims, Yossi Romano, tells of the meeting she and Anka Spitzer, another of the widows, had with a man who claimed to be from the Italian Red Brigades. This man, who was very afraid to be meeting them, told them that the Red Brigades had known something about the planned Black September attack a month and a half before it took place. The man said he belonged to a moderate faction in the Red Brigades that decided to leak the information. He was sent to Hamburg to tell the Germans. He told them that there was going to be a terrorist attack in the Olympic Games. From Hamburg the Germans sent him to Munich, where the security services weren’t interested.

Next he went to the Israeli embassy in Germany. The security officer told him to come back the next day, and when he did, the security officer told him he didn’t have to say anything because they already knew.

Victor Cohen, who was the Shin Bet negotiator during the attack, said he would have had to know if there was any such information. On the other hand, Aharon Yariv, head of the Mossad at the time, told a Dutch newspaper in 1976 that he remembered chairing a meeting in the Defense Ministry during which it was said that there were signs that Black September was preparing a big operation due to take place in a few days time at an international happening. This was five days before the attack. The Olympics Games were the main international event at the time. It would have been natural to make the connection. Yohanan Maroz, who was head of the Europe department of the Israeli Foreign Office, says he saw no early warning reports, although anything of the kind should have passed through him. Later, the Israel Kopel report, the result of the Israeli investigation of the massacre, recommended firing two top Shin Bet officials. The report is still confidential and restricted.

If these reports are true, we can point to several different sources that were saying the same thing. Why was nothing done? International terrorism was flourishing at the time, after all. It’s not as if no one had ever heard of such a thing. Never mind the Germans, let’s say they were blinded by their vision of the “Happy Olympics” and a desire to cancel out the shame left by the 1936 Berlin Olympics. But what is the Israeli excuse? Kimor wonders why the Israeli investigation report, the Kopel report, is still confidential if it’s full of modes of operation that failed thirty years ago. I notice he doesn’t wonder why the German investigation report has not been made public, although it’s obviously not perceived as such a closely guarded state secret as the Israeli report is, or else parts of it wouldn’t have been leaked to him.

Another point that came up: When preparing the security layout for the Olympics, Munich police chief, Manfred Schreiber, ordered a catalogue of possible disturbances and disruptions. One of the points in the report was Scenario 21 that predicted exactly what eventually happened. The scenario was thought unrealistic and disregarded. When Georg Zieber, the police psychologist who wrote the scenario, persisted, his employment contract was discontinued. He tells the story himself in the movie. Dr. Georg Wolf, who was Manfred Schreiber’s second in command in the Munich police force at the time, says he has never heard of Scenario 21, although it was reportedly Schreiber himself who decided that the scenario was unrealistic.

As I said before, with regard to the negotiations conducted with the terrorists, Kimor doesn’t go into details. He does however show a document written by Nahum Admoni, later to become head of the Mossad. He didn’t show it up close, but claims it says that Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, had given an order that the negotiators pretend to be going along with the terrorists demands, as a negotiating ploy. This is the opposite of what Prime Minister Golda Meir stated in public about not giving in to terrorists. Nahum Admoni himself does not remember ever writing such a document. Israeli negotiator Victor Cohen doesn’t react to this directly. He tells about the tactics of a negotiator (I was very taken with him, a very forceful and impressive character) and says that it was not possible to make any headway negotiating with these terrorists.

Much has been said and written about the botched rescue attempt, and it is being covered elsewhere in the BlogBurst. Yarin Kimor tells the story of 17 or 18 German soldiers, who were disguised as air stewards and were on the plane waiting for the terrorists in Fuerstenfeldbruck airfield. These soldiers reportedly deserted their posts 15 minutes before the terrorists and their hostages were due to reach the airfield by helicopter. They failed to notify anyone of their desertion. Kimor says the rumours of the desertion were doing the rounds when he first made a documentary about the massacre, twenty years ago, but he could find no evidence of it at that time.

Now he brings excerpts of the statement given by the soldiers’ commander, Reich, during his interrogation. He gives the reason for the desertion:
1) The soldiers have nowhere to hide.
2) Fear of gunfire from outside of the plane.
3) The gasoline containers of the plane may catch fire.
4) The disguise is imperfect and could lead to their discovery.

The soldiers held a vote. It was unanimous. So 17 or 18 German soldiers were afraid of the two terrorists who were sent to pre-check the plane! German law allowed for them to refuse participating in an operation that could endanger their life. After everything was over, the soldiers were not disciplined in any way.

Thus the hostages were abandoned. According to Kimor, the gunfight that eventually took place was between just five German soldiers and eight armed terrorists. The German soldiers shot an impressive total of 29 bullets. There were 21,000 (unarmed) security officers “securing” the Olympic Games! Were five soldiers and 29 bullets the best the Germans could do?

It’s worth mentioning that the famous Israeli General Staff Commando Unit (“Sayeret Matkal”) had plans for staging a rescue operation of their own. A few months before, they had successfully freed the hostages of the hijacked Sabena plane in Israel. The unit’s commander at the time, Ehud Barak, explains in the movie that they were told to back down, because the Germans would never allow a foreign force to stage such an operation on German land.

The negligence goes on and on. According to the coroner’s report, one of the victims, American-born weightlifter David Berger, died between one hour and one and a half hours after the botched rescue operation was over. He died of smoke inhalation. Kimor says no one had thought to call the fire department.

Just 54 days after the massacre, terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa plane and demanded the release of the three terrorists that survived the rescue operation and were in jail in Germany. The Germans didn’t beat about the bush. All previous brave statements about not giving in to terrorism went out the window. The terrorists were hurriedly released. At the time, the persistent rumors that the Lufthansa hijacking was a sham were regarded as fantastic. But Colonel Wagner, commander of the German Terrorism Combat Unit (this is a direct translation from the Hebrew. I apologize if I’ve translated it incorrectly) says the rumors could very well be true. Commander and co-planner of the Munich Massacre, Abu Daoud, wrote in his book, years later, that the Germans offered them 9 million dollars up front, to stage the hijacking in order to free the terrorists (and rid the Germans of the headache).

It seems the Germans are quite satisfied with the way they conducted the whole affair. Unlike some of the Israelis involved, such as Aharon Yariv, who accepts that Israel was partly responsible for the foul-up. Isn’t that just a typical Jewish thing to do, never letting yourself off easily? Bavarian Interior minister at the time, Bruno Merk, doesn’t display the same disposition for soul-searching. He puts the blame squarely on the Israeli security people.

Dr. Georg Wolf, deputy chief of the Munich police, goes even further. He starts off by blaming the Israelis for refusing to cave in to the terrorists’ demands.

Then he says: “Those responsible were those conducting the wars between Israel and Palestine, the Palestinians, I mean the Arabs.”
The interviewer is then heard saying: “As a host you are responsible for your guests.”
Wolf: “Yes, but as a host I expect my guests not to start a war in my home.”
Interviewer: “The Israelis did not start the war.”
Wolf: “That does not matter.”

In order to give a complete picture, Kimor explains about the Black September organization and commanders Abu Daoud and Ali Hasan Salameh. I see someone else is dealing with this aspect in the BlogBurst, so I won’t get into it here.

Kimor also extensively interviews Professor Gabi Wyman, head of the Communications Faculty in Haifa University. He explains the great success of the massacre from the terrorists’ point of view and the effect it had on the face of terrorism the world over from that day on. Terrorists all over the world realized the strength of such an attack, perfect in timing and location, for getting their message through. Even though the media coverage was not sympathetic to the terrorists, the reporters had to explain the motives of the perpetrators, so that their viewers would understand what was going on. Thus their cause was widely advertised, even among people who regularly wouldn’t be interested. They had taken the whole Olympic games hostage after all, not just the Israeli sportsmen.

And it worked. A good example of this is the fact that in the 1980 Moscow Olympics opening ceremony, Arafat could clearly be seen sitting in the VIP box right next to Brezhniev. It was just eight years and one Olympic games after his subordinates had massacred innocent sportsmen at the very same sporting event.

We’ll never know if the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre of 11 Israeli sportsmen could have been prevented, and if it had been prevented, if they wouldn’t have found some other important world event to do something similar in. But what world event affects so many, and would have had such a powerful effect, worldwide?

We are now one year after terrorists crashed passenger planes into the World Trade Center buildings in New York and into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., killing thousands of innocent people. I put on the radio just now, a day and a half before the beginning of the Jewish New Year. The radio news announcer said that once again the terrorists are making a great effort to perpetrate monumental terrorist attacks on civilians in Israel during the Jewish High Holidays, as they did last Passover.

I’m wondering, rather wistfully, what the world would look like today had the Munich Massacre been prevented and not changed the face of terrorism from that day on. I know it is futile to think about it, what’s done is done, but this seductive thought, instinctively makes my heart jump with false hope and excitement, and simultaneously brings on a dull ache of despair.